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IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 
STATE OF UTAH, in the interest of 
B.B., 
A person under 18 years of age. 
KIMBERLY and KENNETH SCOTT, 
Respondents on Certiorari 
(Appellants in Court of 
Appeals), 
vs. 
SUSAN and GARTH HARDINGER, 
Petitioners on Certiorari 
(Appellees in Court of 
Appeals). 
CaseNo.20020404-SC 
HARDINGERS' OPENING BRIEF ON CERTIORARI 
TO THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
JURISDICTION 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(a) (Supp. 2002) grants jurisdiction to the Utah Supreme 
Court to review of an opinion of the Court of Appeals by writ of certiorari. The Court 
granted Hardingers' petition for writ of certiorari by order entered August 29, 2002. In re 
B.B.. 53 P.3d 1 (Utah 2002). 
Hardingers dispute that the Court of Appeals had jurisdiction to review the decision 
of the Juvenile Court. This is an appeal from an order of the Juvenile Court, and jurisdiction 
1 
over this type of appeal is conferred on this Court by Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(c) (Supp. 
2002). As explained in Points III and IV of this brief, however, the order appealed from was 
not a final order and there was no appeal from the attorney fee order. The Court of Appeals 
therefore lacked jurisdiction to consider the appeal. 
DECISION OF COURT OF APPEALS 
The opinion of the Court of Appeals was filed March 21, 2002. State ex rel. B.B. 
OC.S. v. S.H.\ 2002 UT App 82,45 P.3d 527 (referred to herein as "Opinion"). A copy is 
in the appendix. 
QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Where couples who had participated in raising a child settle their competing 
claims regarding the child by agreeing in court that one couple will be permitted to adopt the 
child and the other couple will have ongoing visitation rights, does entry of the adoption 
decree pursuant to the settlement preclude enforcement of the visitation portions of the 
settlement? This presents a question of law and statutory interpretation which is reviewed 
for correctness. L.S.C. v. State (In re Adoption of A.B.\ 1999 UT App 315, If 8, 991 P.2d 
70, 73. 
2. Does the juvenile court have jurisdiction to enforce its own valid orders, even 
though it may no longer have independent jurisdiction over the child? This presents a 
question of law which is reviewed for correctness. Department of Human Services. Office 
2 
of Recovery Services v. Child Support Enforcement, 888 P.2d 690, 691 (Utah Ct. App. 
1994). 
3. Where a juvenile court determines it has jurisdiction to consider an order to 
show cause on visitation issues and denies a motion to quash the order to show cause, but 
does not enter any order resolving all the issues raised by the order to show cause, is the 
denial of the motion to quash appealable as a final order? This presents a question of law 
which is reviewed for correctness. State ex rel. M.W.. 2000 UT 79, fflj 23-26, 12 P.3d 80, 
85 (Utah 2000) 
4. Did the court of appeals have jurisdiction to review a separate order awarding 
attorney fees where the notice of appeal did not mention the order? This presents a question 
of law reviewed for correctness. Jensen v. Intermountain Power Agency, 1999 UT 10, ^ f 7, 
977 P.2d 474. 
CONTROLLING STATUTES 
Copies of the controlling statutes appear in the appendix. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case. This is an appeal from a juvenile court order denying a 
motion to quash an order to show cause. The order to show cause concerned violation of 
a visitation order entered in a guardianship case. 
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B. Course of Proceedings and Disposition Below. The Scotts' (paternal aunt and 
uncle) petition for custody of B.B. was filed February 23, 1999. (R. 1-9.) Hardingers 
(maternal grandparents1) intervened (R. 41-42) and filed a counter-petition for custody on 
May 12, 1999. (R. 49-57.) On June 15, 1999, the Guardian ad Litem filed a petition to 
terminate the parental rights of the natural parents. (R. 134-139.) An order terminating the 
parental rights was entered January 28, 2000. (R. 278-286.) 
Prior to the trial on the competing petitions for custody (treated by the juvenile court 
as also seeking guardianship of the child, (R. 529 Tf 6)), the Hardingers and the Scotts 
reached an agreement that Scotts would be permitted to adopt B.B. in exchange for which 
Hardingers would be granted certain specified visitation rights. Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law (R. 330-337) and an Order of Custody and Decree of Guardianship (R. 
338-343) were entered on May 19, 2000. A Decree of Adoption entered June 5, 2000, 
granted the Scotts' petition to adopt B.B. (R. 529, lj 8.) 
Scotts denied visitation after the adoption decree, and on August 21, 2000, the 
juvenile court issued an order to show cause to the Scotts. (R. 368-369.) Scotts moved to 
quash the order, asserting the juvenile court no longer had jurisdiction because of the 
adoption. (R. 392-393,370-377.) The juvenile court denied the motion to quash and made 
Although the Hardingers were the biological maternal grandparents of B.B., their rights 
in this action are based on the stipulation reached with Scotts and approved by the Juvenile 
Court after the parental rights of both biological parents had been terminated and before the 
decree of adoption had been entered. At the time of the stipulation and order, B.B. had no 
legal parents, and neither Hardingers nor Scotts had any legal relationship to her other than 
as individuals who had historically been her caregivers. 
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other orders aimed at ultimately resolving the order to show cause. (R. 528-533.) In a 
separate order, the juvenile court awarded Hardingers their attorney fees. (R. 525-527.) 
Scotts filed a notice of appeal. (R. 536-538.) Hardingers moved to dismiss the appeal 
for lack of jurisdiction. The Court of Appeals denied the motion and deferred the issue for 
plenary consideration with the merits. Following oral arguments on the appeal, the Court 
of Appeals entered an opinion resolving the issues in favor of Scotts, with Judge Orme 
dissenting. 
C. Statement of Facts. 
B.B. was born July 29, 1996. From the time of her birth until March 12, 1999, a 
period of 31 months, she resided predominantly with Hardingers, her maternal grandparents. 
(R. 531 J 27.) On February 23,1999, while B.B. was still living with Hardingers, the Scotts 
filed a petition in juvenile court seeking custody of B.B. (R. 1-9). On March 12, 1999, 
B.B.'s mother signed a document purporting to transfer custody to Scotts. (R. 13-16, 528 
Tj 1.) The mother later rescinded that document and explained she had signed it only because 
she was mad at her parents, that she had been coerced into signing it, and she understood it 
was only temporary (R. 96-99), but custody of B.B. was nonetheless transferred to Scotts. 
Hardingers filed their own petition for custody on May 12,1999. (R. 528 ^ f 2.) The parental 
rights of the biological parents were terminated on November 23, 1999. (R. 528.) 
Following participation in court ordered mediation, on May 19,2000, the Hardingers 
and the Scotts made an agreement to resolve their competing claims for custody. The Scotts 
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promised to allow future visitation to the Hardingers in exchange for which Hardingers 
agreed to support the adoption of B.B. by the Scotts. (R. 529 Tflj 5-6.) At the time of this 
agreement, B.B., who was nearly four years old, had lived with Hardingers for the first 31 
months of her life and with the Scotts for 14 months. 
Seventeen days after the May 19, 2000, settlement agreement, on June 5, 2000, the 
juvenile court granted a decree of adoption to the Scotts. The decree did not mention the 
visitation rights. (R. 529 f^ 8.) The juvenile court expressly found, however, that it would 
not have granted the adoption but for the prior stipulation and order granting visitation rights 
to the Hardingers. (R. 531 fflf 2-3; Opinion ^ 20 (Orme, J., dissenting).) 
Only nineteen days after the adoption, Scotts denied Hardingers visitation. (R. 530 
Tf 22.) The initial justification for the denial was a claim of sexual abuse,2 but the juvenile 
court found this claim did not justify the visitation denial particularly after safeguards were 
suggested. (R. 530 ^ 23.) Hardingers obtained an order to show cause seeking to have 
Scotts held in contempt for violating the visitation order and seeking makeup visitation and 
other sanctions. (R. 368-69.) In response, the Scotts filed a motion to quash the order to 
show cause, claiming the juvenile court lacked jurisdiction to enforce the prior visitation 
order. (R. 392-393.) 
On October 24, 2000, the juvenile court entered an order, entitled "Finding of Fact 
Conclusions of Law and Order," denying the motion to quash. (R. 528-533.) The court also 
Subsequent proceedings in the juvenile court, not part of the record, demonstrated that 
the claim of sexual abuse was completely unfounded. 
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entered a separate order, entitled "Order of Attorney's Fees and Judgment," granting 
attorney fees to the Hardingers related to the order to show cause. (R. 525-527.) On 
November 1,2000, Scotts filed a notice of appeal, stating that they appealed "the ruling of 
the Court on the Motion to Quash and Objection to Setting Hearings without reopening the 
file." (R. 536-538.) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The Court of Appeals incorrectly viewed this case as implicating the right of parents 
to raise their child. The right of Scotts to raise their child was not impaired, however, 
because Scotts voluntarily agreed to the challenged visitation. Rather, this appeal presents 
the question of whether parties who have stipulated to a court order to resolve a lawsuit can 
later avoid the stipulation and order simply because the parties have changed their minds. 
The Court of Appeals erred in holding that the juvenile court's enforcement of Scotts' 
voluntary stipulation somehow interfered with Scotts' right to raise their child. Although 
permanency in adoptive placements is an important legislative goal, allowing parents to 
ignore their own agreements does not promote permanency. 
A court always has jurisdiction to enforce its own valid orders. The Court of Appeals 
erred in holding that because the juvenile court no longer had jurisdiction to issue new 
visitation orders, it therefore lacked jurisdiction to enforce its prior orders. Nothing in the 
adoption statutes nor in the juvenile court statutes abrogates the inherent jurisdiction and 
duty of the juvenile court to enforce its own order. 
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The order appealed from, by its own terms, was not final. The juvenile court held it 
had jurisdiction to proceed, and ordered an evaluation as part of the ongoing proceedings. 
The holding that the order was final departed from prior rulings of this Court. 
The purported challenge to the attorney fee award is also jurisdictionally deficient. 
Scotts' notice of appeal did not include the attorney fee award. The holding of the Court of 
Appeals to the contrary departed from prior rulings of this Court. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
ADOPTIVE PERMANENCY IS NOT PROMOTED BY 
PERMITTING PARENTS TO UNILATERALLY 
CHANGE OR IGNORE THEIR OWN VOLUNTARY 
AGREEMENTS REGARDING POST-ADOPTION 
VISITATION. 
The United States Supreme Court recognized in Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57,65-
66 (2000), that parents have a fundamental liberty interest in making decisions concerning 
the best interests of their children without interference from the state or others. Utah 
statutes, as recognized by the opinion of the Court of Appeals, grant adoptive parents these 
same rights. Opinion ^ 14. The instant appeal does not in any way challenge the right of 
parents under normal circumstances to make decisions concerning their child. The issue 
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presented by this appeal, rather, is whether parents are sovereigns able to make and change 
those decisions at will without regard to their own prior agreements and court orders. 
The Court of Appeals held parents are not bound by their own agreements regarding 
the best interests of their child if the parents later change their minds as to whether the 
agreement was in the best interest of the child. The Guardian Ad Litem and the Scotts urged 
the Court of Appeals to take this position based on a claim that it was necessary to promote 
the sanctity of adoptions. The public policy of the state does not, however, require the 
avoiding of a visitation contract made in anticipation of adoption, particularly where that 
contract merely provided for the continuance of an established relationship which the 
prospective parents, at the time of the contract, agreed was in the best interest of the child. 
The validity of pre-adoption visitation contracts is an important issue of law which should 
be settled by this Court. 
A. The holding that the juvenile court imposed a visitation order on Scotts is 
contrary to the record. 
The Court of Appeals held: 
The juvenile court's fashioning of a conditional decree 
of adoption is not consistent with the above principles. 
Furthermore, a conditional decree of adoption would impose a 
duty upon the Parents that is not generally required of natural 
parents; namely, that the Parents either make their child 
available to visit with non-relatives not of their choosing or be 
held in contempt of court. 
Opinion <[j 16 (italics added). 
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The fallacy of this conclusion is that the juvenile court order did not require the Scotts 
to make their child visit with non-relatives not of their choosing. Scotts agreed to the 
visitation order. It was not imposed on them. Scotts helped choose the times for visitation. 
Scotts agreed that the visitation be with Hardingers. Scotts' attorney drafted the order. 
Scotts agreed that the visitation was in B.B.'s best interest. (R. 338-343.) There was no 
claim nor evidence that Scotts were in any way coerced to make this agreement. It was 
entirely voluntary. It was simply wrong to hold that the visitation order "imposed" on Scotts 
an obligation to make B.B. available to visit with non-relatives "not of their choosing." 
Granted, the visitation with Hardingers was "not of [Scotts'] choosing" at the time 
for enforcement of the visitation order. It would be a very dangerous precedent indeed, 
however, to hold that a stipulated order is somehow rendered less voluntary and less 
enforceable just because the parties do not continually reaffirm their desire to enter into the 
stipulation anew. The fact that Scotts do not now choose to honor their contract does not 
mean that the initial contract was not of their own choosing. Adoptive parents should 
generally not be forced to make their child available for visitation with non-relatives, but 
there was no force here. 
B. An Agreement Is Binding Even If the Court Lacked Jurisdiction to Impose It. 
Absent the Scotts' preadoption stipulation, it is likely that the juvenile court could not 
have awarded visitation to Hardingers postadoption. The lack of an independent basis for 
visitation does not, however, impair the enforceability of the visitation right. The concept 
10 
that a court may enforce an agreement which the court would not have had authority to 
impose is not new to Utah law. In Despain v. Despain, 627 P.2d 526 (Utah 1981), a father 
agreed to provide support for two of his children so long as they resided with the mother and 
were full-time students. He later discovered two court opinions which held the trial court 
lacked authority to impose support past age twenty-one and sought an order vacating his 
obligation to provide support past the twenty-first birthday of each child. He also relied on 
a statutory change which clarified that the court cannot impose support past age twenty-one. 
The court rejected his claim, noting the distinction between the statutory authority to impose 
an order and the authority to enforce an agreement: 
Defendant has failed to observe the distinction between 
those cases involving the statutory power of a court in a divorce 
proceeding to enter orders concerning support and those cases 
in which the parties in a divorce action have settled their 
property rights by agreement, the terms of which are 
incorporated in a decree. The limitations on the power of the 
court to order support do not limit the rights of a husband and 
wife to contract with respect to the education of their children 
as part of an agreement settling their property rights. A 
husband, who has undertaken an obligation in consideration of 
the provisions of the property settlement agreement which were 
for his benefit, cannot subsequently complain that the court, in 
the absence of such agreement, would have been without power 
to order him to do so. 
627 P.2d at 527. 
The court further noted the inequity which would be inherent in allowing the husband 
to retain all the benefits of his having made an agreement but avoid the burden of that 
agreement: 
11 
Defendant has not urged any compelling reasons for 
invoking the powers of equity to abrogate the property 
settlement; nor has he shown a change of circumstances to 
justify modification of the child support payments. Over a 
period of three years the parties were involved in attaining an 
agreement. Both made concessions in exchange for benefits. 
. . . It is a proper assumption that plaintiff settled for the sum 
she received in reliance on the availability of additional funds 
to assist the children, living with her, in completing their 
education. It would be highly inequitable under the 
circumstances of this case to permit defendant to retain the 
benefits and be relieved of the obligations he assumed in his 
bargain with plaintiff. 
627 P.2d at 528. 
Other courts have recognized this concept that a party may agree to and be bound by 
obligations beyond that which the court could have imposed initially. In Kotler v. 
Spaulding. 510 N.E.2d 770, 772 (Mass. Ct. App. 1987), the court held: "We are of opinion 
that there is a significant difference between a provision for education rendered by a judge 
pursuant to [the statutory provision allowing for support until age 21] following litigation, 
and a judgment or order which incorporates and requires compliance with the provisions of 
a bargained-for agreement." The court further held that such a voluntary agreement "may 
be enforced by means of a contempt proceeding." Id 
By pretending to promise that Hardingers would have ongoing visitation rights, 
Scotts obtained Hardingers' consent to the adoption. The court likely would not have been 
able to make the finding required by Utah Code Ann. § 78-30-9 (Supp. 2002) that the 
adoption was in the best interest of B.B. but for the stipulation that B.B. would enjoy 
12 
ongoing visitation with the Hardingers-the Juvenile Court expressly found that that 
stipulation was necessary for the court to have granted the adoption and that the visitation 
was in B.B.'s best interest. (R. 531 fflf 2, 4.) It was only thirty-six days later, after the 
adoption had been granted,3 that Scotts denied any obligation to honor their agreement and 
allow visitation. Where Scotts already had the benefit they wanted under the agreement, it 
is manifestly inequitable to shield them from honoring their obligations under the agreement. 
C. Conditional adoptions are not contrary to Utah statutes or public policy. 
The Court of Appeals held: "The juvenile court's fashioning of a conditional decree 
of adoption is not consistent with the above principles," Opinion Tf 16, apparently referring 
to the legislative goal to prevent disruption of adoptive placements. Opinion f^ 14. This 
presents an important question of state law which has not been, but should be, settled by this 
Court: Does this State permit conditional or open adoptions? The negative answer of the 
Court of Appeals to this question conflicts with prior decisions of this Court and of the 
Court of Appeals's own expression of public policy.4 
In In re Adoption of Hallowav. 732 P.2d 962,972 n. 11 (Utah 1986), this Court noted 
that "[a]n innovative approach to adoption, called an open adoption, is gaining increased 
3In light of Utah Code Ann. § 78-30-4.15(2) (Supp. 2002), which provides that a 
"fraudulent representation . . . is not a basis for . . . vacation of an adoption decree," and 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-30-4.16(3) (Supp. 2002), which states that an "adoption may not be 
contested after the final decree of adoption is entered," it would have been very difficult for 
Hardingers to have undone the adoption at that point. 
4The decision is also squarely at odds with the Juvenile Court's finding that the visitation 
was in the best interests of B.B. 
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recognition among professionals in the adoption field and may be suited to this case." 
Notwithstanding this favorable reference by this Court to open adoptions in 1986, the Court 
of Appeals has now held that Utah law precludes the post-adoption enforcement of any pre-
adoption visitation agreement or order, at least where the agreement arises in the juvenile 
court5. The statutes and cases do not support this ruling. 
The adoption decree was entered barely two weeks after the visitation order. The 
juvenile court held it would not have granted the adoption if the parties had not agreed to 
the visitation order. (R. 531 ffij 2-3; Opinion K 20 (Orme, J., dissenting).) Under established 
case law, the visitation order and adoption decree must be considered contemporaneous, and 
the later adoption decree did not bar the prior visitation order. Stubbs v. Hemmert 567 P.2d 
168, 169-70 (Utah 1977) (the determination of whether or not merger occurs depends on 
whether the terms of the earlier contract are collateral to the subsequent document, and 
"depends to a great extent on the intent of the parties with respect thereto."); Shields v. 
Harris, 934 P.2d 653, 657 (Utah Ct. App. 1997) ("when two agreements are executed 
substantially contemporaneously and are clearly interrelated, they must be construed as a 
whole and harmonized if possible") (quotation marks and citations omitted). 
It is important to emphasize the context in which this issue arises. Hardingers and 
Scotts had competing petitions seeking custody of and guardianship over B.B. Scotts had 
recently obtained physical custody of B.B., but historically B.B. had resided in the Hardinger 
5The court's logic would apply only to juvenile courts. Pre-adoption visitation orders 
would continue to be enforceable in district court. See Point II at page 17. 
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home. (R. 531, ^ | 27.) To resolve the competing petitions, the parties agreed that Scotts 
would adopt B.B. but Hardingers would continue to have visitation. The Decree of Adoption 
did not, therefore, change the existing placement of B.B. 
In situations where the existing placement does not change, public policy (and the 
best interest of the involved child) favors continuing, not terminating, existing bonds of the 
child: 
Furthermore, in home placement cases, like the present 
case, we emphasize that there is no need for the state to inter-
vene on behalf of the child and cut off the rights of the natural 
father to ensure immediate and continued physical care or 
uninterrupted bonding of a child to its new adoptive parents, 
because the mother continues to fulfill a parental role. Espe-
cially when the mother and child live with an adoptive 
grandparent under circumstances which will remain the same, 
allowing a father to continue to provide financial support and 
maintain his relationship with the child has the potential of 
benefitting, not harming, the child. 
T.S.v.L.F.. 2001 UT App 183, Tf 20,27 P.3d 583 (citations, quotation marks, and brackets 
omitted). 
As in T.S., the instant case is a "home placement" case. B.B. had already been living 
with the Scotts for a brief period, and while living with the Scotts had enjoyed ongoing 
visitation with Hardingers. Prior to that B.B. had lived with Hardingers. The Decree of 
Adoption did not change that placement with Scotts, so public policy clearly favors 
promoting B.B.'s best interest by allowing Hardingers to continue their relationship with 
her. 
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The one thing that all of the evaluators agreed on in this case was that Hardingers 
were important to B.B. and that it was in her best interest that they continue to have 
extensive visitation rights. Scotts willingly stipulated to those visitation rights in order to 
procure the Hardingers' cooperation in the adoption. Although Scotts now want to renege 
on their stipulation, nothing in the statutes or case law shields them from being required to 
comply with their agreement. 
The juvenile court also focused on several Court of Appeals opinions which hold that 
the visitation rights of grandparents end upon termination of parental rights. Opinion Tf 13. 
This principle has no application here, because Hardingers' visitation rights arose by 
agreement and court order, not because of their status as the biological grandparents of B.B. 
The parental rights of the biological parents were terminated on November 23, 1999. (R. 
528.) The visitation rights at issue in this case were created by stipulation and order on May 
19,2000. At that point, neither the Scotts nor the Hardingers had any legal right to visitation 
by reason of the biological relationship, but only as historical caregivers to B.B. Cases 
which hold that biological grandparents have no post adoption visitation rights therefore 
have no application to this proceeding. 
POINT II 
A JUVENILE COURT HAS JURISDICTION TO 
ENFORCE ITS OWN ORDER. 
The Court of Appeals determined that the jurisdiction of the juvenile court over B.B. 
terminated when the adoption occurred. The court extrapolated from that conclusion to hold 
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that the juvenile court lacked jurisdiction to enforce its own prior visitation order. Not only 
is it bad policy to hold that a court cannot enforce its own order, but it is contrary to the 
juvenile court statutes and not supported by the logic of the Court of Appeals. 
The Court of Appeals held: 
In reading the statutes relating to child welfare 
proceedings and to adoptions so as to harmonize them, 
we conclude that the juvenile court had no jurisdiction 
over the Parents or B.B. after the adoption took place. 
The statutes share a common goal of providing stable, 
permanent homes for adoptive children and allowing 
these newly formed families to exist on the same basis as 
all other families. Hence, once its basis for jurisdiction 
ended, the juvenile court could not assume jurisdiction 
over B.B. until and unless the requisite statutory 
requirements for jurisdiction were reestablished. 
Opinion Tf 15. 
This quotation illustrates that the Court of Appeals was concerned with the concept 
of open or conditional adoptions. Rather than squarely holding that conditional adoptions 
are invalid (something which should be left to the legislature, Utah Power & Light Co. v. 
Provo. 94 Utah 203, 250, 74 P.2d 1191, 1211 (Utah 1937)), the Court of Appeals strained 
to construct a jurisdictional bar. The logic of the Court of Appeals cannot stand scrutiny. 
The fallacy of the court's reasoning is evident when one considers the validity of a 
pre-adoption visitation agreement made in district court. District courts have jurisdiction 
over adoptions except where the juvenile court has terminated parental rights, Utah Code 
Ann. §§ 78-3a-104(l)(o), 78-30-7(1) (Supp. 2002), yet are courts of general, not limited, 
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jurisdiction. Utah Code Ann. § 78-3-4(1) (Supp. 2002). Had the visitation order here been 
entered by the district court, there would be no question that the court retained jurisdiction 
to enforce the order. Principles of equal protection do not permit invalidating a pre-adoption 
visitation order entered in juvenile court while enforcing an identical order entered in district 
court. 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-3a-121(2)(a)(i) (Supp. 2002) provides that the juvenile court 
can terminate its own jurisdiction by express order to that effect. The Court of Appeals 
expanded the statutory language to hold that jurisdiction of the juvenile court continues until 
there is any order that resolves the initial basis for jurisdiction. Opinion ^ 11-12. The 
majority of the Court of Appeals ignored the equally binding provision that the juvenile 
court always retains jurisdiction to enforce its own orders through the contempt power. Utah 
Code Ann. § 78-3a-901(l) (Supp. 2002) provides: "Any person who willfully violates or 
refuses to obey any order of the court may be proceeded against for contempt of court." 
The Court held the juvenile court jurisdiction continued "until a permanent custody 
order or adoption was achieved. Opinion U 12. The Order of Custody and Decree of 
Guardianship entered shortly before the adoption (R. 338-343), however, was such a 
permanent custody order. Under the logic of the Court of Appeals, the Order of Custody 
and Decree of Guardianship terminated the jurisdiction of the juvenile court, leaving it 
without jurisdiction to grant the adoption. 
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The Court of Appeals also asserted that the Hardingers' visitation rights terminated 
upon the termination of the biological parents' rights. Opinion f^ 13. That termination, 
however, occurred months before the visitation order under review. (R. 278-286.) The 
Hardingers' visitation rights arose from the Scotts5 agreement and the juvenile court's order, 
not from the biological relationship. Because the visitation rights were not based on the 
biological relationship, the adoption did not terminate those rights. 
It is important to understand the nature of the order under appeal. All the juvenile 
court did was enforce its own prior order. The previous order, entered May 19,2000, only 
implemented an agreement made by the parties. The appealed order did not "award" post-
adoption visitation rights, it only enforced a prior order. No one claimed the prior order was 
improper or invalid. 
The issue presented by this case is whether a court retains jurisdiction to enforce its 
own order. The answer must be "yes." That is all that occurred here. To enable them to 
adopt B.B., Scotts agreed that Hardingers could have visitation. The Decree of Adoption 
was entered only 17 days after the visitation order. Once they got what they wanted, Scotts 
then attempted to renege on their part of the bargain. Scotts don't deny they agreed to the 
visitation and agreed in was in B.B.'s best interest, they just claim the juvenile court now 
lacks jurisdiction to compel them to honor their agreement. 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-3a-901 (Supp. 2002) expressly grants the juvenile court the 
contempt power to enforce its orders. A court has inherent jurisdiction to enforce its own 
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order, even when the initial justification for jurisdiction is gone. Koehlerv.Grant 213 B.R. 
567,569 (8th Cir. BAP 1997) (bankruptcy court can enforce order by contempt proceeding 
after case is closed); Cramer v. Petrie. 637 N.E.2d 882, 884 (Ohio 1994) (court can enforce 
child support order by contempt after child is emancipated). In Cramer, the court held: 
Furthermore, we see no reason why a court's inherent 
authority to enforce a lawfully issued child support order must 
end when the child is emancipated. More is at stake than the 
mere nonpayment of support. Also at stake is the court's strong 
interest in seeing, as a general matter, that its orders are not 
disobeyed with impunity. This interest exists independently of 
the child who is the subject of the order because it concerns the 
exercise of the court's judicial functions and ultimately the 
public's confidence in the judicial system. 
637 N.E.2d at 884-85 (italics added).6 
Scotts have not questioned that the juvenile court had jurisdiction to enter the 
visitation order. It follows that the court had jurisdiction to enforce that order. Even though 
the court may have lost jurisdiction to make new orders regarding visitation, the court 
retained jurisdiction to enforce the order previously made. 
6The Court of Appeals asserted that Cramer was distinguishable because it involved an 
order which was violated before the child's status changed. Opinion at f 16 n. 5. While the 
facts in Cramer may be technically different than the facts in the present action, the principle 
for which Cramer was cited is still very applicable. It would seriously erode public 
confidence in the judicial system to allow a party to disobey an order with impunity solely 
because of a change in the status of the child-a change that was contemplated at the time the 
order was entered. Public confidence in the judicial system would be eroded if a party could 
receive a benefit from promising to grant visitation but then be excused from having to 
actually allow the visitation. The courts should not condone duplicity. 
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POINT III 
THE ORDER APPEALED FROM WAS NOT FINAL 
BECAUSE SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES REMAIN PENDING 
BEFORE THE JUVENILE COURT. 
An appeal as of right may be taken only from a final order. Utah R. App. P. 4(a). A 
final order is one which "ends the litigation on the merits and leaves nothing for the court to 
do but execute the judgment." Croslandv.PecL 73 8 P.2d 631,632 (Utah 1986) (citation and 
quotation marks omitted). Determining the finality of a juvenile court order is problematic. 
There may be several final orders during the time the minor is subject to the jurisdiction of 
the juvenile court. This case presented the situation of retained jurisdiction to review the 
child's welfare. In addition, the order to show cause which invoked the court's jurisdiction 
had not been resolved. The Court of Appeals focused on the retained jurisdiction, but 
ignored the incomplete resolution of the order to show cause. 
Scotts appealed the denial of their motion to quash an order to show cause. The 
Court of Appeals held the denial was an appealable order, apparently concluding that the 
denial order actually ruled on the merits of the order to show cause. The Court of Appeals 
held: "[t]he finality was not affected by the juvenile court's retention of jurisdiction over the 
juvenile for further proceedings." Opinion j^ 7. While it is true that the juvenile court 
retained jurisdiction for further proceedings, the Court of Appeals ignored the fact that the 
juvenile court never actually ruled on the order to show cause. Although the court resolved 
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the primary, jurisdictional issue raised by the order to show cause, other substantive issues 
remain pending before the juvenile court. 
The order to show cause raised six specific numbered issues, plus one catch all. Of 
those six, only two were resolved by the juvenile court's order. Among the issues which 
remain pending are requested makeup visitation and a re-evaluation of custody. (R. 368 fflj 
2, 6.) Also pending was Hardingers' request for more specific orders regarding telephone 
visitation, (R. 368 ^  4) and for reimbursement for counseling costs. (R. 368 If 5.) The order 
under appeal resolved none of these issues. It ordered a family and psychosexual 
investigation (R. 531 ^ 5) and left the cost of that evaluation to be determined by future 
order. (R. 532, Conclusions j^ 6, Order ^ 7.) It temporarily limited Mr. Hardinger's right to 
unsupervised visitation, with ongoing visitation apparently to be reviewed after the 
psychosexual evaluation. (R. 532 f^ 4.) In short, the order resolved the jurisdictional issue 
and established a plan for resolution of the remaining issues. It did not resolve any issue 
except jurisdiction to consider the remaining issues. 
The Court of Appeals analogized the instant case to a divorce proceeding where the 
court determines custody but retains continuing jurisdiction to modify the determination. 
Opinion ^ 8 n. 2. A more accurate analogy would be to a temporary order of custody in a 
divorce case. The juvenile court here held that it had jurisdiction and that visitation would 
continue as provided in the pre-adoption order, but never resolved many of the issues raised 
by the order to show cause. It is evident from the wording of the post adoption visitation 
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order that the court intended to resolve the remaining order to show cause issues after the 
evaluation and investigation by Dr. Jay Jensen. R. 531 % 5. 
The denial of a motion to dismiss or a motion to quash leaves the action still pending 
and is not a final order. Little v. Mitchell 604 P.2d 918, 919 (Utah 1979); R.H.D. v. S.F. 
(In re Babv KX 967 P.2d 947, 950 (Utah Ct. App. 1998). Although the juvenile court's 
holding that it had jurisdiction resolved the primary disputed issue and left the parties with 
little interest in fine-tuning the visitation, jurisdiction is not determined from the parties' 
interest in pursuing the litigation to its final finish, but by whether any part of the dispute 
still technically remains. ProMax Dev. Corp. v. Raile, 2000 UT 4, If 15, 998 P.2d 254 (an 
unresolved attorney fee claim defeated finality, even though the primary dispute had been 
fully resolved); A.J. Mackav Co. v. Okland Construction Co., 817 P.2d 323, 325 (Utah 
1991) (finality defeated by pending counterclaim even though the primary dispute had been 
resolved and no one was interested in pursing the counterclaim; "acquiescence of the parties 
is insufficient to confer jurisdiction on the court"). 
Because there was no final order to appeal, the Court of Appeals lacked jurisdiction. 
The appeal should have been dismissed. This Court should, accordingly, vacate the opinion 
of the Court of Appeals. 
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POINT IV 
THE HOLDING THAT THE NOTICE OF APPEAL 
INCLUDED THE ATTORNEY FEE ORDER 
CONFLICTS WITH THIS COURT'S DECISION IN 
JENSEN V. INTERMOUNTAINPOWER AGENCY. 
The Court of Appeals appears to have adopted a rule that, when multiple orders are 
issued a following a single hearing, an appeal of only one of those orders automatically 
includes the other orders. This holding is not supported by the language of Rule 3 of the 
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure and conflicts with this court's holding in Jensen v. 
Intermountain Power Agency. 1999 UT 10, 977 P.2d 474. 
Rule 3(d) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure requires that "the notice of appeal 
. . . shall designate the judgment or order, or part thereof, appealed from." The requirement 
is jurisdictional. Jensen. 1999 UT 10, U 7, 977P.2d474,476. The Jensen court reaffirmed 
that the notice of appeal must state "specifically which judgment is being appealed." Id. 
(citation and quotation marks omitted). 
Is apparent from the record that at least two separate matters were heard by the 
juvenile court on September 6,2000. One was the order to show cause issued at the request 
of the Hardingers, which included a request for attorney fees. The second was the Scotts' 
motion to quash that order to show cause. The court issued two orders following the 
hearing: Order of Attorney's Fees and Judgement ("Attorney Fee Order"), which addressed 
only attorney fees for contempt, and Finding of Fact Conclusions of Law and Order (labeled 
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by the Court of Appeals as "Visitation Order"), which denied the motion to quash and held 
the juvenile court had ongoing jurisdiction. 
The notice of appeal in this case states that it appeals "the ruling of the Court on the 
Motion to Quash and Objection to Setting Hearings without re-opening the file." The Court 
of Appeals, after quoting the language of the notice of appeal, held: "While the notice 
provided by this statement is not ideal, it sufficiently notifies the Grandparents that the 
orders resulting from the September 6,2000 hearing are being appealed, particularly where 
the orders bear the same date." Opinion Tf 10. This conclusion is puzzling, because nothing 
in the notice of appeal specifies the date of the hearing nor the date of the order being 
appealed. Moreover, the language of the notice of appeal was not a generic reference to all 
matters raised the hearing-in fact, the notice does not even mention the hearing. What the 
notice of appeal did mention was a single7 specific ruling: "the ruling of the Court on the 
Motion to Quash and Objection to Setting Hearings without re-opening the file." The only 
order in the file which matches this description is the Findings of Fact Conclusions of Law 
and Order entered October 24, 2000. 
Jensen and Appellate Rule 3 hold the notice of appeal must specify the order appealed 
from. The Order of Attorney's Fees and Judgement (R. 525-27) is not specified in the 
7The definite article "the" "is a word of limitation as opposed to the indefinite or 
generalizing force of'a' or 'an.'" Brooks v. Zabka. 450 P.2d 653,655 (Colo. 1969) (citations 
omitted). Accord State v. Gonzales, 2000 UT App. 136,ffi[ 15,28,2P.3d954,958n.2,961 
(both the majority and concurring opinions agreed on the limiting nature of "the"). 
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Notice of Appeal, either by inference or by association. This Court should hold there was 
no valid appeal from the Order of Attorney's Fees and Judgement. 
POINT V 
HARDINGERS SHOULD BE AWARDED THEIR 
ATTORNEY FEES ON APPEAL. 
The juvenile court awarded Hardingers their attorney fees incurred in enforcing their 
visitation rights. This Court should similarly award Hardingers their attorney fees on appeal. 
Valcarce v. Fitzgerald. 961 P.2d 305, 319 (Utah 1998). 
CONCLUSION 
This Court should leave to the legislature the policy determination of whether 
conditional adoptions should be barred. The attempt of the Court of Appeals to create such 
a bar through a flawed jurisdictional analysis should be reversed. The case should be 
remanded to the juvenile court for further proceedings on the order to show cause. 
The judgment for attorney fees in favor of Hardingers should be reinstated, and 
Hardingers should be awarded their attorney fees on appeal. 
DATED this _ / ^day of November, 2002. 
JOHN L. VALENTINE and (J 
LESLIE W. SLAUGH, for: 
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN 
Attorneys for Appellees 
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GREENWOOD, Judge: 
fl K.S and K.S. (the Parents) are the adoptive parents of B.B, 
They appeal a juvenile court order asserting jurisdiction to 
enforce a pre-adoption visitation order issued in favor of S.H. 
and G.H., B.B. 's biological maternal grandparents (the 
Grandparents), after the Parents adopted B.B. The Parents also 
appeal the juvenile court's order awarding attorney fees to the 
Grandparents. Because we conclude the juvenile court lacked 
jurisdiction, we reverse both orders. 
BACKGROUND 
%2 The parental rights of B.B.'s biological mother and father 
were terminated after the juvenile court determined B.B. was a 
neglected child. The Parents1 and the Grandparents filed 
competing petitions for custody and guardianship of B.B. To 
resolve the dispute, the Grandparents agreed to withdraw their 
petition and allow the Parents to obtain custody in exchange for 
visitation rights. The Grandparents also agreed to support the 
Parents' adoption of B.B. The juvenile court then entered an 
order establishing a visitation schedule (the Pre-adoption 
Visitation Order) stipulated to by the parties. Seventeen days 
later, the juvenile court granted the Parents' adoption petition. 
The adoption decree did not mention the Pre-adoption Visitation 
Order or visitation in any form for the Grandparents. 
1f3 After the Parents adopted B.B., they initially allowed the 
Grandparents to exercise visitation as specified in the Pre-
adoption Visitation Order. Out of concern for B.B., however, the 
Parents terminated B.B.'s visits with the Grandparents. The 
Grandparents then filed an Order to Show Cause requiring the 
Parents to appear in juvenile court to show cause why they should 
not be held in contempt for not abiding by the Pre-adoption 
Visitation Order. The Parents filed a Motion to Quash the Order 
to Show Cause, claiming the juvenile court's jurisdiction ended 
when it granted the Parents' petition for adoption. The juvenile 
court denied the Motion to Quash and entered two separate orders: 
(1) Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law & Order (the Visitation 
Order) ; and (2) Order of Attorney Fees and Judgment (the Attorney 
Fee Order). The Visitation Order asserted jurisdiction and 
granted the Grandparents visitation rights pursuant to the 
stipulated Pre-adoption Visitation Order. The Attorney Fee Order 
required the Parents to pay the Grandparents' attorney fees 
incurred for the Order to Show Cause. This appeal followed. 
ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
1|4 The Grandparents argue that the Visitation Order is not-
final; thus denying this court jurisdiction. We determine 
whether an order is final as a matter of law. See In re M.W., 
2000 UT 79,1(1(23-26, 12 P. 3d 80. The Grandparents also contend 
that the Parents» appeal of the Attorney Fee Order was not 
adequately raised in the Parents' Notice of Appeal. We determine 
whether the Notice of Appeal is adequate to grant this court 
jurisdiction as a matter of law. See Jensen v. Intermountain 
Power Agency, 1999 UT 10,1(7, 977 P.2d 474. 
1J5 The Parents and the guardian ad litem argue the juvenile 
court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to enter the Visitation 
Order subsequent to the adoption decree. Whether a court has 
1. K.S. is the sister of B.B.'s biological father. 
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subject matter jurisdiction is a question of law that we review 
for correctness. See Burns Chiropractic Clinic v. Allstate Ins. 
Co. , 851 P.2d 1209, 1211 (Utah Ct. App. 1993). The Parents also 
argue that because the juvenile court lacked subject matter 
jurisdiction, it should not have awarded attorney fees. In this 
context, we review the award of attorney fees for correctness. 
See Campbell v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 2001 UT 89,1113, 
432 Utah Adv. Rep. 44. 
ANALYSIS 
I. Finality of the Visitation Order 
1(6 The Grandparents argue this court lacks jurisdiction because 
the Visitation Order was not a final order. The Visitation Order 
stated, among other things, that the juvenile court had subject 
matter jurisdiction to enforce the Pre-adoption Visitation Order, 
and the Grandparents were entitled to visitation rights as set 
forth in the Pre-adoption Visitation Order. Subsequent to the 
Visitation Order, the juvenile court reviewed the Pre-adoption 
Visitation Order and modified it. Because of these subsequent 
modifications, the Grandparents argue that the Visitation Order 
was not a final order. We disagree. 
1|7 The Court of Appeals has original jurisdiction over appeals 
from juvenile court. See Utah Code Ann. § 78-3a-909(l) (1996). 
Rule 3 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure states: "An 
appeal may be taken from a . . . juvenile court to the appellate 
court with jurisdiction over the appeal from all final orders and 
judgments . . " Utah R. App. P. 3(a) (emphasis added). 
Generally, "a judgment is final when it ends the controversy 
between the parties litigant." Bradbury v. Valencia, 2000 UT 
50,H9, 5 P.3d 649 (citation and quotations omitted). In In re 
M.W. , 2000 UT 79,1126, 12 P. 3d 80, the supreme court held that an 
order entered after an adjudication hearing on a petition of 
abuse was final for purposes of appeal. The finality was not 
affected by the juvenile court's retention of jurisdiction over 
the juvenile for further proceedings. In so holding, the Utah 
Supreme Court stated: 
The finality of an order in juvenile 
proceedings is determined the same way as the 
finality of an order in other courts . . . 
"A final, appealable older is one that ends 
the current juvenile proceedings, leaving no 
question open for further judicial action." 
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[T]he juvenile court continues to have 
jurisdiction over and periodically reviews 
the case, but that does not mean the . . . 
adjudication is not final. 
Id. at H1J25-2G (citations omitted) . Accordingly, even though a 
juvenile court periodically reviews its orders, the orders may 
still be final for purposes of appellate review. 
H8 The Visitation Order expressly held that the juvenile court 
had subject matter jurisdiction over B.B., and that the 
Grandparents were entitled to visitation rights under the Pre-
adoption Visitation Order. The hearing subsequent to the 
issuance of the Visitation Order was merely a review of that 
order. The Visitation Order resolved the controversy between the 
parties as raised in the Order to Show Cause concerning the 
juvenile court's jurisdiction to enforce the Pre-adoption 
Visitation Order. Because the Visitation Order was final, we 
have jurisdiction to hear this appeal.2 
II. Adequacy of the Notice of Appeal 
H9 While conceding that the Attorney Fee Order was final for 
purposes of appeal, the Grandparents argue that because the 
Parents failed to mention the Attorney Fee Order in their Notice 
of Appeal, it is not properly before this court. For an appeal 
to be properly raised, "[t]he notice of appeal . . . shall 
designate the judgment or order, or part thereof, appealed from 
. . . . " Utah R. App. P. 3(d). The Utah Supreme Court has held 
that this requirement is jurisdictional because "'the object of a 
notice of appeal is to advise the opposite party that an appeal 
has been taken from a specific judgment in a particular case.'" 
Jensen v. Intermountain Power Agency, 1999 UT 10,117, 977 P.2d 474 
(quoting Nunley v. Stan Katz Real Estate, 15 Utah 2d 126, 388 
P.2d 798, 800 (1964)). However, " [n]otices of appeal are to- be 
liberally construed." Roberson v. Dranev, 54 Utah 525, 182 P. 
212, 213 (1919) (citations and quotations omitted); see also 
U.P.C., Inc. v. R.O.A. Gen., Inc., 1999 UT App 303,1128, 990 P.2d 
945. 
HlO The Parents' Notice of Appeal states that they appeal "the 
ruling of the court on the Motion to Quash and Objection to 
Setting Hearings without re-opening the file." While the notice 
2 . Similar circumstances exist in divorce proceedings when the 
court initially determines which parent shall have custody of the 
children and the visitation rights of the non-custodial parent, 
subject to the court's continuing jurisdiction to modify those 
determinations. See Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5 (Supp. 2001). 
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provided by this statement is not ideal, it sufficiently notifies 
the Grandparents that the orders resulting from the September 6, 
2000 hearing are being appealed, particularly where the orders 
"bear the same date.3 Therefore, the Notice of Appeal is 
sufficient for this court to assume jurisdiction over the issue 
of attorney fees. 
III. Jurisdiction of the Juvenile Court 
1Jll The Parents and the guardian ad litem argue the juvenile 
court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to enter the Visitation 
Order subsequent to the adoption decree. Under Utah law, the 
juvenile court can maintain continuing jurisdiction over B.B. 
until she is 21 years old, unless the court terminates 
jurisdiction prior to that time. See Utah Code Ann. § 78-3a-
121(1) (Supp. 2001). "The continuing jurisdiction of the court 
terminates . . . upon order of the court." Id. § 78-3a-
121(2) (a) (i) . Hence, the dispositive issue is whether a decree 
of adoption is an "order of the court" that terminates the 
juvenile court's jurisdiction. To resolve this issue, we turn 
first to the plain language of Utah's juvenile court statutes and 
adoption statutes. See State v. Fixel, 945 P.2d 149, 151 n.2 
(Utah Ct. App. 1997) (" [T] he primary consideration in statutory-
construction is 'to give effect to the legislature's intent. To 
discover that intent, this court looks first to the plain 
language of the statute.'" (Citation omitted.)); see also Lyon 
v. Burton, 2000 UT 19,1117, 5 P.3d 616 ("The plain language of a 
statute is to be read as a whole, and its provisions interpreted 
in harmony with other provisions in the same statute and 'with 
other statutes under the same and related chapters.'" (Citation 
omitted.)). 
1fl2 Utah's juvenile courts are creatures of statute, and thus 
are courts of limited jurisdiction. See In re adoption of 
Trimble, 16 Utah 2d 188, 398 P.2d 25, 26 (1965); In re S.L.-.- 1999 
UT App 390,152, 995 P.2d 17 (Wilkins, P.J., concurring). Because 
they are courts of limited jurisdiction, juvenile courts are 
allowed to do only what the legislature has expressly authorized. 
See In re S.L. , 1999 UT App 390 at ^52 (stating juvenile court 
"powers are necessarily limited"). Utah Code Ann. § 78-3a-104 
describes the bases for the juvenile court's original 
jurisdiction. In this case, the juvenile court acquired 
jurisdiction over B.B. because she was allegedly abused and 
neglected. See id. § 78-3a-104(l) (c) . The juvenile court 
ultimately granted the guardian ad litem's petition to terminate 
3. To avoid contentions over this issue in the future, we 
strongly encourage appellants to provide in the notice of appeal 
the caption and date of the orders from which they appeal. 
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the parental rights of B.B.'s biological parents. See id. § 78-
3a-411. At that point, B.B. had no legal parents and the 
^juvenile court had jurisdiction until a permanent custody order 
or "adoption was achieved. See id. § 78-3a-104(l) (c) . Once the 
juvenile court granted the Parents' petition for adoption, the 
original basis for jurisdiction over B.B. ceased to exist because 
B.B. was no longer an abused or neglected child and permanency 
had been achieved. See generally Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-3a-312 to 
-313 (Supp. 2001). 
1fl3 Based on the above statutory provisions, this court has held 
that visitation rights of both biological parents and 
grandparents end upon termination of parental rights. See In re 
A.B. , 1999 UT App 315,1121, 991 P. 2d 70 ("Grandmother's visitation 
rights were extinguished by operation of law when the court 
terminated her child's parental rights."); Kasper v. Nordfelt, 
815 P.2d 747, 751 (Utah Ct. App. 1991) ("[W]here a child has been 
released [for adoption] any visitation rights of the child's 
natural family end with the initiation of such adoption 
proceedings.").4 
1fl4 With respect to adoption in Utah, the legislature has 
expressly found that 
(a) the state has a compelling interest in 
providing stable and permanent homes for 
adoptive children in a prompt manner, in 
preventing the disruption of adoptive 
placements . . . . 
(c) adoptive children have a right to 
permanence and stability in adoptive 
placements; 
(d) adoptive parents have a constitutionally 
protected liberty and privacy interest in 
retaining custody of an adopted child. 
4. As permitted by Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure 24 (i), the 
Grandparents submitted Utah Code Ann. § 30-5-2(4) (Supp. 2001) as 
supplemental authority, claiming that it provides this court with 
an independent basis to affirm the juvenile court's decision. 
However, we do not consider this argument because the proceedings 
at issue were not conducted pursuant to section 30-5-2(4) and, as 
a result, the juvenile court did not consider any possible 
application of the cited statute. In addition, the Grandparents 
failed to raise this issue below and have not briefed the issue. 
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Utah Code Ann. § 78-30-4.12(2) (1996) . In order to grant a 
petition for adoption: 
(1) The court shall examine each person 
appearing before it . . . separately, and if 
satisfied that the interests of the child 
will be promoted by the adoption, it shall 
enter a final decree of adoption declaring 
that the child is adopted by the adoptive 
parent or parents and shall be regarded and 
treated in all respects as the child of the 
adoptive parent or parents. 
(2) The court shall make a specific finding 
regarding the best interest of the child, 
taking into consideration information . . . 
relating to the health, safety, and welfare 
of the child and the moral climate of the 
potential adoptive placement. 
Id. § 78-30-9 (Supp. 2001). Consistent with the legislature's 
stated intent to prevent the disruption of adoptive placements, 
Utah adoption law states, "[T]he adoptive parent or parents and 
the child shall sustain the legal relationship of parent and 
child, and have all the rights and be subject to all the duties 
of that relationship." IcL. § 78-30-10 (1996). 
^15 In reading the statutes relating to child welfare 
proceedings and to adoptions so as to harmonize them, we conclude 
that the juvenile court had no jurisdiction over the Parents or 
B.B. after the adoption took place. The statutes share a common 
goal of providing stable, permanent homes for adoptive children 
and allowing these newly formed families to exist on the same 
basis as all other families. Hence, once its basis for 
jurisdiction ended, the juvenile court could not assume 
jurisdiction over B.B. until and unless the requisite statutory 
requirements for jurisdiction were reestablished. See Troxel v. 
Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 68-69, 120 S. Ct. 2054, 2061 (2000) 
(" [S] o long as a parent adequately cares for his or her children 
. . . there will normally be no reason for the State to inject 
itself into the private realm of the family to further question 
the ability of that parent to make the best decisions concerning 
the rearing of that parent's children."). 
liio The juvenile court's fashioning of a conditional decree of 
adoption is not consistent with the above principles. 
Furthermore, a conditional decree of adoption would impose a duty 
upon the Parents that is not generally required of natural 
parents; namely, that the Parents either make their child 
available to visit with non-relatives not of their choosing or be 
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held in contempt of court. See In re A.B., 1999 UT App 315 at 
n.l (noting that " [v]isitation between grandmother and" the 
children is now at the discretion of the adoptive parents").5 
Therefore, because B.B.'s adoption ended the jurisdiction of the 
juvenile court, we reverse the juvenile court's Visitation Order. 
IV. Attorney Fees 
tl7 The Parents appeal the juvenile court's award of attorney 
fees. Because the juvenile court lacked subject matter 
jurisdiction, it follows that it lacked jurisdiction to assess 
attorney fees against the Parents. See Burns Chiropractic Clinic 
v. Allstate Ins. Co., 851 P.2d 1209, 1212 (Utah Ct. App. 1993) 
("Because we reverse the trial court . . . we also reverse the 
court's grant of attorney fees."). Therefore, we reverse the 
award of attorney fees and order each party to pay its own 
attorney fees on appeal. 
CONCLUSION 
1fl8 This court has jurisdiction because the Visitation Order is 
a final order and because the Notice of Appeal provided adequate 
notice that the appeal included the Attorney Fee Order. The 
juvenile court lacked jurisdiction over this case after B.B.'s 
adoption, and could not grant an adoption petition conditional on 
visitation rights in the Grandparents. Therefore, the juvenile 
court could neither enforce the Pre-adoption Visitation Order 
after the adoption, nor assess attorney fees against the Parents. 
Accordingly, we reverse. 
Pamela T. Greenwood, Judge 
5. The Grandparents cite Cramer v. Petrie, 637 N.E.2d 882 (Ohio 
1994) , for the proposition that allowing the Parents to disregard 
the Pre-adoption Visitation Order encourages disobedience of 
juvenile court: orders. We find the facts of Cramer to be 
distinguishable. In Cramer, the court sought enforcement of a 
p h i 1 H q n n n n r f r\-rr\&r t - h a t - u i a c ^ r i n l q f o H -r\-rn r>v* t- Q t h e C h i l d ' S 
emancipation, although the enforcement action commenced after 
emancipation. See id. at 883. In this case, the Order to Show 
Cause related to failure to comply with an order that was lawful 
when entered, but not lawful or enforceable after the adoption 
when the order was allegedly violated. 
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1fl9 I CONCUR: 
Judith M. Billings, 
Associate Presiding Judge 
ORME, Judge (dissenting): 
1[2 0 What actually happened here is this: The adoptive parents 
and the grandparents, each of whom had had the care of the child 
at different times, filed competing adoption petitions. The 
parties ultimately stipulated to a resolution the trial court 
found to be in the child's best interest: the adoptive parents 
would adopt the child and the grandparents would have visitation, 
a schedule for which was specifically agreed to. Once they got 
what they wanted--adoption--the adoptive parents reneged on their 
agreement and withheld visitation. When this bait-and-switch was 
called to the trial court's attention, the court was 
understandably concerned about the adoptive parents' failure to 
adhere to their stipulated obligations and the court's order. 
This failure is particularly troubling in view of the trial 
court's explicit finding that, but for the visitation agreement, 
it would not have granted the adoptive parents' adoption 
petition. Like any court, the trial court here had jurisdiction, 
even though a final judgment had been entered, to enforce its 
prior orders. See Utah Code Ann. § 78-3a-901 (1) (Supp. 2001). 
1|21 In my view, then, this is not a case about whether 
conditional adoption is permitted in Utah or about the legal 
effect of an adoption decree. It is, first and foremost, a case 
about whether a trial court has the power to enforce an order 
stipulated to by parties over whom it had jurisdiction and which 
order was a quid pro quo for the judgment both sides asked it to 
enter. 
f22 Because the trial court clearly has such power and prudently 
exercised it in this case, I would affirm. 
Grego3£^K. Orme, Judge 
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APPENDIX "B" 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law (R. 330-337) 
m
 192000 
Mr. BROOK J. SESSIONS (6 J U>» 
HARRIS & CARTER, a L.L.C. 
Attorney for the SCOTTS 
3325 N. University Ave., Ste. 200 
Jamestown Square, Clocktower Bldg. 
Provo, Utah 84604 
Telephone: * ' - ^<>! 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT JUVENILE COURT 
PROVO DEPARTMENT 
IN AND FOR UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
ST ATI- til UTAH, In FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
BLUNDELL, BAYLIE (07/29/96) 
Person(s) under (18) years of age. 
( ase: 968282 
Judge: JERIL B. WILSON 
I'HIS I V J M I T R hnunu emu hi-mir rli 27, 
2000. The issues before the Court were a h-titn>n toi Custody and 
Guardianship file : v\ - n and Kimberly Scott; a Petition tor Custody 
a: i i Mill H,ijili"«rei .nul .i Petition 
•<)i Grandparent Visitation !iu\: r .orraine Warren. Present before 
the court > -e petitioners, Ken and Kimberly Scott with their 
c< ^ cssions. Lorraine Warrc . * attorney Brook 
Sessions v -t< . . 1 Garth Hardinge 
Burrows; Kelly Frye from the Guardian •: i :iem's office * ; •!* of 
m e parties entered a Stipulation into the record and 
agreed to be bound thereby. Based upon the stipulation, the Court 
hereby makes the following: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. The Maternal Grandparents, Susan and Garth 
Hardingers', petition for custody should be allowed to be 
withdrawn by the Hardingers. 
2. The Court should grant guardianship and permanent 
legal and physical custody of Baylie Blundell to Kimberly 
and Ken Scott. 
3. The Scott's have filed a Petition for Adoption of Baylie 
Blundell based upon the agreement of the Hardingers; 
the Hardingers have agreed to support the adoption. 
4. Contact with the biological parents should not be 
allowed unless the Scott's, Lorraine Warren, or the 
Hardingers supervises contact. The biological parents 
are never to be with Baylie Blundell in an unsupervised 
setting. The biological parent's parental rights have been 
terminated. Nothing in these findings or subsequent 
order shall give the biological parents any right to 
enforce any visitation with Baylie Blundell. 
5. The Hardingers should be awarded statutory visitation as 
set forth in Utah Code Annotated 30-33-35. Said 
visitation should be modified as set forth herein. 
6. The Hardingers will exercise visitation with Baylie on 
alternating weekends. They will be allowed to pick up 
Baylie at 4:30 p.m. on Fridays and return her by 7:30 
p.m. on Sundays every other weekend. 
Midweek visitation by the Hardingers will be on those 
wet.-!- reekend ' tai. r joe f ' ccur. The 
Hardingers ^ u a Kx\ .- • < 
return her 30 p.m f ^ midweek visits. 
VV i :• recognized holidays <>r school holidays 
family having Bay lie with them n\ duu weekend will also 
have the holiday. 
T h a n k s g i v i n g 1: 1 o 1 i d • * r • r i i \ i • * : a i u i. 
For Thanksgiving 2000 the Hardingers \.i.e r,. lie 
with them from Wednesday before the holiday at 6:00 
p.in i in iul;i>i MIIIMVUIIJ.! liu tiuml.r, ai 7:30 p.m. 
Thereafter, they will have Bavin with them even iher 
year. 
Christm*!'* imitation should '*•- 4 pecified. Baylie will be 
with the - nit's for then f. ^i,.J..v 
prior to Christmas Day from approximately 
until 8:00 p.m. She will go :ie Hardingers' family 
parlv rvrp -; ' *- - pi -\iniaiely J'Oll p.m. 
to 8:00 p.m. She • always n. v •* h*- v:otts on 
Christmas morning and Christmas Eve after 
Hardinger I lie Christmas school break will be 
divided appiuAiiiiatilj1 equally 
having Baylie the firs* half ie Christmas School Break 
and the other par", having nc second half of the 
Christmas School Break as worked out with the special 
master . 
11. Baylie will spend July 3rd and July 4th of each year with 
the Scott's. Baylie will be with the Hardingers on July 
23 r d beginning at 6:00 P.M. and all day on the 24th unless 
the 24th (Pioneer Day) is celebrated on Saturday or 
Monday due to it falling on Sunday, then the visit will 
begin the day before it is celebrated at 6:00 P.M. and 
continue until 11:00 P.M. the day it is celebrated. 
12. The parties will provide each other with an itinerary of 
vacation plans for all extended vacations. Said itinerary 
will include phone numbers. 
13. The Hardingers will call Baylie on Wednesday evenings 
when they do not have mid-week visits and on Sunday 
evenings when they do not have weekend visits. The 
calls will be made between 7:30 p.m. and 8:00 p.m. The 
parties will work with the Special Master to arrange 
appropriate phone calls during extended visitation and 
to make arrangements for one additional weekly phone 
call. Baylie will be allowed to contact either of the 
families at any time or any place. 
14: The Hardingers will have four weeks of vacation time (28 + 
QjyJ. days) with Baylie. dujkig^oummoi vaialJi|ii_Jiia^ 
15. For the year 2000, the Hardingers will have vacation with 
Baylie from April 18th at 10:00 a.m. until April 22nd at 
6:00 p.m. 
16. '1 ho tiaidiiiget nil have Baylie on June 18th from 8:30 
A.M. through June J41 ,,i "7 ]\) i'fu i.n an extended 
vacation. 
17. -:: A *. Baylie August 15, 2000 through 
August 21st, Tom - u to 7:30 p.m. on 
the 21st. 
18. Although not one ot the four weeks fnr nurr\Vf)nr 
w&atktft, 'he Haiiliiu't i Aill have Baylie from December 
27th through January 1st, 2001, this i\ I In second half of 
the Christmas School Break. 
1 ° Tii. ivm,i... Hardingers/foax^saa^ 
vacation for the ycai i.-*. - : ea UUL wA..i* the 
Special Master. 
20. Thi Seott^ ^tull have four weeks of family vacation with 
Baylie. 
21. For the year 2000, Baylie *-;11 N* wit] ^n 
AI in I 'Mli through April 16th for a trip : Disney Land. 
22. Baylie will • •* •! y ;:irough the 
14,h ior a naseball tourname;, ' • •». 
23 Bavlie \\\U Hi win ;MC Scott's from JU u *• mough 
11! I v » * * : e o 
24 Lorraine Warren : ... • \feudal jimniei visitation 
each year. The visitation Uu \ear 2000 shall be from 
August -lih through August 13th and a liki amount each 
year thereafter. 
25. The parties will work with the Special Mastc ••' 
scheduling events such as birthdays and other family 
events . 
26. The parties have agreed to and the Court should appoint 
a Special Master. If available, Liz Dalton should be 
appointed by the Court to be a Special Master. The cost 
of the Special Master should be shared equally for joint 
sessions. For individual time with the Special Master, the 
party who is having the individual time with the Special 
Master shall be responsible for payment for that time. 
27. The Special Master should be appointed to work with the 
parties to implement the visitation schedule, facilitate 
communication and assist in problem solving. 
28. The Special Master may consult with the Guardian ad 
Litem as necessary. 
29. The parties have agreed to work with a Special Master 
and to adopt a family plan which will include but is not 
limited to the provisions set forth in U.C.A. §30-3-33. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. This Court has jurisdiction over the parties. 
2. This Court has jurisdiction over the subject matter. 
3. The Court should enter a Decree of Custody and Guardianship 
to the Scott's. 
4. An Order shoulc no entered by the t.'ouri adopting the pnoi 
Findings ol Fact and implementing the same. 
. ^ i i i " " " ' / / , , . 
D A l l . h Hi" ' ^ d.i', nl ,1 / ( fu, /^r-" '20Q0.-<sf% 
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Approved as Lo Form: 
Dana Burrows 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that pursuant to the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure, I personally mailed a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing on this 'ZS day of f\pf') \ , 2000, by 
first-class, U.S. Mail, postage prepaid to the following: 
Office of the Guardian Ad Litem 
Attn: Kelly Frye 
32 W. Center Street, Suite #205 
Provo UT 84601 
Mr. Dana Burrows 
Attorney for Garth and Susan Hardinger 
1149 W. Center 
Orem, Utah 84057 
APPENDIX "C" 
Order ol ( u s lod \ and I >i'i:rt.v ol ( niaidianslii|> IK US- > l i ) 
FILED 
MAY 1 9 2000 
juvenile Court 
Fourth District 
Mr. BROOK J. SESSIONS (6136) 
HARRIS & CARTER, a L.L.C. 
Attorney for the SCOTTS 
3325 N. University Ave., Ste. 200 
Jamestown Square, Clocktower Bldg. 
Provo, Utah 84604 
Telephone: 375-9801 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT JUVENILE COURT 
PROVO DEPARTMENT 
IN AND FOR UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, In the Interest of: ORDER OF CUSTODY AND 
DECREE OF GUARDIANSHIP 
BLUNDELL, BAYLIE (07/29/96) Case: 968282 
Person(s) under (18) years of age. Judge: JERIL B. WILSON 
1 
THIS MATTER having came before the court on March 27, 
2000. The issues before the Court were a Petition for Custody and 
Guardianship filed by Ken and Kimberly Scott; a Petition for Custody 
and Guardianship filed by Susan and Garth Hardinger; and a Petition 
for Grandparent Visitation filed by Lorraine Warren. Present before 
the court were petitioners, Ken and Kimberly Scott with their 
counsel Brook J. Sessions; Lorraine Warren with her attorney Brook 
Sessions; Susan and Garth Hardinger with their attorney Dana 
Burrows: Kelly Frye from the Guardian ad Litem's office on behalf of 
the child. The parties entered a Stipulation into the record and 
agreed to be bound thereby. Being duly advised and having made 
appropriate Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, the Court 
hereby enters the following: 
ORDER OF CUSTODY AND DECREE OF GUARDIANSHIP 
1. The Maternal Grandparents, Susan and Garth Hardingers', 
petition for custody has been withdrawn upon Motion of the 
Hardingers. 
2. The Court hereby grants guardianship and permanent legal and 
physical custody of Baylie Blundell to Kimberly and Ken Scott. 
3. The Hardingers have agreed to and are Ordered to support the 
Adoption of Baylie Blundell by the Petitioners, Kimberly and Ken 
Scott. 
4. Contact with the biological parents shall not be allowed unless 
the Scott's, Lorraine Warren, or the Hardingers supervises 
contact. The biological parents are never to be with Baylie 
Blundell in an unsupervised setting. The biological parent's 
parental rights have been terminated. Nothing in this order shall 
give the biological parents any right to enforce any visitation with 
Baylie Blundell. 
5. The Hardingers are awarded and may exercise statutory visitation 
as set forth in Utah Code Annotated 30-33-35. Said visitation is 
modified as set forth herein. 
6. The Hardingers shall be allowed to exercise visitation with Baylie 
on alternating weekends. They may pick up Baylie at 4:30 p.m. 
on Fridays and return her by 7:30 p.m. on Sundays every other 
weekend. 
7. Midweek visitation by the Hardingers will be on those weeks 
when weekend visitation does not occur. The Hardingers may 
pick up Baylie at 4:30 p.m. and shall return her by 7:30 p.m. for 
midweek visits. 
8. When statutorily recognized holidays or school holidays fall on a 
^gigfflHag Thursday, Friday, or Monday, the family having 
Baylie with them on that weekend will also have the holiday. 
9. For Thanksgiving 2000 the Hardingers will have Baylie with them 
from Wednesday before the holiday at 6:00 p.m. until Sunday 
following the holiday at 7:30 p.m. Thereafter, they will have 
Baylie with them every other year. 
10. Baylie will be with the Scott's for their family party on the 
Sunday prior to Christmas from approximately 4:00 p.m. until 
8:00 p.m. She will go to the Hardingers' family party every 
Christmas Eve from approximately 4:00 p.m. to 8:00 p.m. She 
will always be with the Scotts on Christmas morning and 
Christmas Eve after the Hardingers' party. The Christmas school 
break will be rij>irkri npprQiuuintdy equally with one household 
having Baylie the first half of the Christmas School Break and the 
other party having the second half of the Christmas School Break 
as worked out with the special master. 
11. Baylie will spend July 3rd and July 4th of each year with the 
Scott's. Baylie will be with the Hardingers on July 23rd beginning 
at 6:00 P.M. and all day on the 24lh unless the 24th (Pioneer Day) 
is celebrated on Saturday or Monday due to it falling on Sunday, 
then the visit will begin the day before it is celebrated at 6:00 
P.M. and continue until 11:00 P.M. the day it is celebrated. The 
parties will provide each other with an itinerary of vacation plans 
for all extended vacations. Said itinerary will include phone 
numbers . 
12. The parties shall provide each other with an itinerary of 
vacation plans for all extended vacations. Said itinerary is to 
include phone numbers. 
13. The Hardingers may call Baylie on Wednesday evenings when 
they do not have mid-week visits and on Sunday evenings when 
they do not have weekend visits. The calls shall be made between 
7:30 p.m. and 8:00 p.m. The parties are to work with the Special 
Master to arrange appropriate phone calls during extended 
visitation and to make arrangements for one additional weekly 
phone call. Baylie shall be allowed to contact either of the 
families at any time or any place. 
14. The Hardingers will have four weeks (28 days) of vacation , . , 
time with Baylie dagk%—M+H.unei wHruliun fioiii s^l^el. 
15. For the year 2000, the Hardingers will have vacation with 
Baylie from April 18th at 10:00 a.m. until April 22nd at 6:00 p.m. 
16. The Hardingers will have Baylie on June 18th at 8:30 A.M. 
through June 24th at 7:30 P.M. for an extended vacation. 
17. The Hardingers will have Baylie August 15, 2000 through 
August 21s t, from 9:00 a.m. on the 15th to 7:30 p.m. on the 21st. 
18. Although not one of the four weeks fnr inmiimrt l/aLirtwan, the 
Hardingers will have Baylie from December 27lh through January 
V\ 2001, this is the second half of the Christmas School Break. 
19. The remainder of the Hardingers four weeks of^iiimmpr -
v ^ j ^ r i for the year 2000 shall be worked out with the Special 
Master. 
20. The Scott's shall have four weeks of family vacation with 
Baylie. 
21. For the year 2000, Baylie will be with the Scott's from April 
9th through April 16th for a trip to Disney Land. 
22. Baylie will be with the Scott's from May 12th through the 14th 
for a baseball tournament in Wendover. 
23. Baylie will be with the Scott's from June 30th through July 15th 
for a trip to Mexico. 
24. Lorraine Warren shall have extended summer visitation each 
year. The visitation for the ypar 2000 shall be from August 4th 
erf J***t pnjt uu*&. 
through August 13 thand/ai like* amount each year thereafter. 
25. The parties will work with the Special Master in scheduling 
events such as birthdays and other family events. 
26. The parties have agreed to and the Court should appoint a 
Special Master. If available, Liz Dalton is hereby appointed by the 
Court to be a Special Master. 
27. The cost of the Special Master is to be shared equally for joint 
sessions. For individual time with the Special Master, the party 
who has the individual time with the Special Master shall be 
responsible for payment for that time. 
28. The Special Master is appointed to work with the parties to 
implement the visitation schedule, facilitate communication and 
assist in problem solving. 
29. The Special Master may consult with the Guardian ad Litem as 
necessary. 
30. The parties have agreed to work with a Special Master and to 
adopt a family plan which will include but is not limited to the 
provisions set forth in U.C.A. §30-3-33. 
./S'X 
DATED this J±_ day of "~~yW,<L~f #£/ \^£ N ' .L j>06$.l 




Approved as to Form: 
| 0 \ co0^x /*= 
JUD^TEREt^ WIL'SSk 
Kelly Frye 
Approved as to Form: 
Dana Burrows 
APPENDIX "D" 
Order to Show Cause (R. 368-369) 
FILED 
DANAD. BURROWS - 5045
 g 1 
Attorney for Intervenor Maternal Grandparents " * 
n 4 9 WTeif , C ? ^ 7 Juvenile Court 
Orem, Utah 84057 _ .. ,-,. . •
 + 
Telephone: (801) 222-9700 F o u r t h D , S t n C t 
IN THE FOURTH DISTRICT JUVENILE COURT 
FOR UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, in the interest of 
BLUNDELL, BAYLIE 2 7/29/96 
A Person(s) under eighteen years of age 
ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE 
Case #968282 001 
Judge Jeril B. Wilson 
TO HLMBERLY AND KEN SCOTT: 
You are hereby ordered to appear before the above-entitled Court on Tuesday, the 29th day 
of August, 2000, at 10:00 a.m., before Judge Jeril B. Wilson, at the courthouse located at Fourth 
District Juvenile Court, 2021 South State, Provo, Utah then and there to show cause, if any you have: 
1. Why you should not be held in contempt of court for your refusal to comply with the order 
of the court as it relates to in person visitation as well as telephone visitation and why the 
court should not impose appropriate sanctions at the time of the hearing. 
2. Why the Hardinger's should not be entitled to make up visitation. 
3. Why you should not be responsible for the Hardinger's attorney's fees and costs with the 
Special Master as a result of your noncompliance and refusal to follow the Special Master. 
4. Why the court should not specify the telephone visitation and enter such orders that will allow 
telephone visitation to occur and ordering you to allow Baylie to return phone calls. 
5. Why you should not be responsible for counseling costs that have been necessitated and will 
continue for a period of time. 
6. Why the court should not change custody residence of Baylie Blundell from you immediately 
to the Hardingers. 
7. For such other and further relief as the court deems just and appropriate in this matter. 
DATED this Q~( day of August, 2000. 
%#z u T^  
APPENDIX "E" 
Order of Attorney's Fees and Judgement (R. 525-527) 
FILEO 
OCT E 4 2000 
DANAD.BURROWS-5045 Jisvemie Court 
Attorney for Intervenor Maternal Grandparents Four th Dis t r i c t 
1149 West Center 
Orem, Utah 84057 
Telephone: (801) 222-9700 
IN THE FOURTH DISTRICT JUVENILE COURT 
FOR UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, in the interest of 
BLUNDELL,BAYLIE 4 7/29/96 
A Person(s) under eighteen years of age 
ORDER OF ATTORNEY'S FEES 
AND JUDGEMENT 
Case #968282 001 
Judge Jeril B. Wilson 
The above-entitled matter having come before the court by way of the Maternal Grandparents, 
Garth and Susan Hardinger's request for attorney's fees as a result of their Order to Show Cause and 
the court having had the opportunity to consider the matter and being fiilly advised in the premises, 
now, therefore, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED: 
1. The attorney's fees incurred by Garth and Susan Hardinger were reasonable and necessary 
under the circumstances. 
2. The fees were incurred in large part because of the Scott's failure to comply with the 
recommendations of the Special Master, Elizabeth Dalton, which necessitated the Order to 
Show Cause hearing. 
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3. The Hardinger's are awarded judgment against Ken and Kimberly Scott for attorney's fees 
in the amount of $2,795.17. 
APPROVAL AS TO FORM 
BROOKE! SESSIONS 
Attorney for Scotts 
APPROVAL AS TO FORM 
KELLY FRYE 
Guardian ad Litem 
& 
DATED this 2- V day of Sept^*er^2000.
 v»«iimi///;,. 
.WILSOH. C O ^ ' / * -
DISTRICT COURT J U T J ^ A - . . . . . - v ^ 
NOTICE TO SCOTT'S ATTORNEY AND GUARDIAN AD LITEM 
TO: BROOK J. SESSIONS, Attorney for Scotts and KELLY FRYE, Guardian Ad Litem 
PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that the undersigned, attorney for Intervenor Maternal 
Grandparents, Garth and Susan Hardinger, will submit the above and foregoing Order of Attorney's 
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Fees and Judgment to the Fourth District Court for signature, upon the expiration of five (5) days 
from the date of this Notice, plus three (3) days for mailing, unless written objection is filed prior to 
that time, pursuant to Rule 4-504 of the Rules of Judicial Administration. 
DATED this / ^ ^ day of September, 2000. 
Attorney for Intervenor Maternal Grandparents 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on this 1%^ day of September, 2000,1 mailed a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing Order of Attorney's Fees and Judgment, postage prepaid, to the following; 
Brook J. Sessions 
3325 N University Ave Ste 200 
Jamestown Square, Clocktower Bldg 
Provo UT 84604 
Kelly Frye 
Guardian Ad Litem 
32 W Center St 
Provo UT 84601 
'uXfrAD. BURROWS 
0 0 5 2 , 
APPENDIX "F" 
Findings of Fact Conclusions of Law and Order (R. 528-533) 
OCT 2 4 2000 
Juvenile Cour 
IN THE FOURTH DISTRICT JUVENILE COURT ^ourth DJStrlC 
IN AND FOR UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, In the Interest of: 
FINDING OF FACT 
BLUNDELL, BAYLIE 07/29/96 CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
AND ORDER 
A person under 18 years of age, 
Case Number 968282 
This matter having come before the Court on Wednesday, September 6, 2000, for hearing 
on the Hardinger's Motion for Hearing requesting the Scotts be held in contempt of the Court for 
failing to allow visitation. Ken and Kimberly Scott appeared with their attorney, Brook Sessions. 
Susan and Garth Hardinger appeared with their attorney Dana Burrows. Baylie's Guardian Ad 
Litem, Kelly Frye appeared on Baylie's behalf. The court appointed Special Master appeared and 
gave a report to the court. The Court heard arguments from counsel and reviewed the pleadings 
on file and the report from that Special Master but did not take testimony. Being duly advised in 
the premises, the Court makes the following: 
FINDING OF FACT 
1. On February 23, 1999, Ken and Kimberly Scott, paternal aunt and uncle filed a 
petition in Juvenile Court for custody of Bay lie Blundell. 
2. On May 12, 1999, Susan and Garth Hardinger, maternal grandparents filed a petition 
in Juvenile Court for custody of Bay lie Blundell. 
3. On September 28, 1999, Fourth District Judge James Taylor certified the issues of 
custody, visitation, and child support to the Fourth District Juvenile Court. 
4. On November 23,1999, an evidentiary hearing took place wherein the parental rights 
of both the father and the mother of Bay lie Blundell were terminated. 
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5. Through the efforts of court ordered mediation the Hardingers withdrew their petition 
for custody and supported adoption by the Scotts. In return, the Scotts agreed to allow future 
visitation to the Hardingers. 
6. On May 19, 2000, pursuant to stipulation, the Court granted custody and guardianship 
of the minor, Baylie Blundell to Ken and Kimberly Scott. The stipulation provided that the 
Hardingers would withdraw their Petition for Custody and Guardianship in return for visitation 
with Baylie. The Stipulation of the parties also included that the Hardingers would support the 
adoption of Baylie by the Scotts. 
7. The visitation order of May 19, 2000 appointed a Special Master to help the parties 
implement the visitation. 
8. The Decree of Adoption entered on June 5, 2000 granted the Scott's Petition to adopt 
Baylie. The Decree changes Baylie Blundell's name to Baylie Scott. The Decree of Adoption 
does not address visitation. 
9. Juvenile Court file number 986074 is entitled State of Utah in the interest of Baylie 
Scott and is a sealed adoption file. 
10. Juvenile Court file number 968282 is entitled State of Utah in the interest of Baylie 
Blundell and addresses the proceedings prior to the adoption. 
11. Pursuant to statute, the adoption file was sealed. 
12. On or about August 11, 2000, counsel for the Hardingers filed a Motion for an Order 
to Show Cause to enforce the visitation order signed May 19, 2000. 




14. Said Motion and signed Order were sent to counsel for Ken and Kimberly Scott by 
counsel for the Hardingers on August 11, 2000. 
15. Personal service on Ken and Kimberly Scott was not obtained. 
16. No Motion was made to reopen the closed adoption file. 
17. No Motion was made to unseal the adoption file. 
18. On or about August 25,^2000 counsel for the Scott's filed a motion to Quash the 
Order to Appear and Show Cause. 
19. The Motion to Quash requests the Order to Show Cause be quashed for the following 
reasons: the file has not been unsealed nor reopened; the Juvenile Court does not have 
jurisdiction after the adoption; and that the Order of Custody and Guardianship does not survive 
the adoption. 
20. At the September 6, 2000 hearing counsel for the Scotts made an oral motion to 
certify the case back to the District Court and transfer the file, which motion was denied. 
21. At the September 6, 2000 hearing counsel for the Scotts made an oral motion to stay 
the order of visitation pending an appeal, which motion was denied. 
22. The court finds that after June 24, 2000 the Scotts have not allowed visitation to the 
Hardingers as required by the Order. 
23. Initially such refusal may have been justified because of allegations of sexual abuse, 
however, continued refusal of visitation after safeguards were suggested was not justified. 
24. The Court finds the Scotts have not followed the continuing recommendation of the 
Special Master for visitation. 
25. The Scotts presented by Affidavit the reasons for their denial of visitation. 
3 
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26. The Court finds that it has jurisdiction to enforce its visitation order of May 19, 2000. 
27. Baylie had resided predominately with Hardingers from the time of her birth until 
March 12, 1999, a period of 31 months and during this period the Hardingers had been Baylie's 
primary care giver. 
28. Baylie has a significant attachment to both the Scotts and the Hardingers. 
29. It is in the best interest of Baylie to have visitation with the Hardingers. Both Dr. 
Featherstone and Dr. Williams (the evaluators) found that there was a strong bond between 
Baylie and the Hardingers and that visitation was in Baylie's best interest. 
30. It is in Baylie's best interest that the parties not discuss the alleged sexual abuse with 
her. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. The Court finds that it has jurisdiction to enforce its visitation order of May 19, 2000 
2. The Court granted the Order of Custody and Guardianship dated May 19, 2000 and the 
adoption dated June 5, 2000, of the minor, Baylie Blundell to Ken and Kimberly Scott because of 
the stipulation between the Scotts and the Hardingers which provided the Hardingers would 
withdraw their Petition for Custody and Guardianship in return for visitation 
3. The Court finds that the Hardingers withdrew their petition for custody and supported 
adoption by the Scotts because of the Scotts agreement to allow future visitation to the 
Hardingers. 
4. It is in the best interest of Baylie to have visitation with the Hardingers. 
5. The parties are to cooperate with and obtain a family evaluation and psychosexual 
investigation by Dr. Jay Jensen. 
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6. Each party is to pay one half of Dr. Jensen's fee. Final apportionment is reserved to a 
later date. 
7. The parties shall follow the recommendations of Dr. Jensen, the Guardian ad Litem, 
Dr. Jenkins and the Special Master for future visitation. 
ORDER 
1. Scott's Motion to Quash is denied. 
2. Scott's motion to certify the case back to the District Court is denied. 
3. Scott's motion to stay visitation is denied. 
4. The parties shall follow the recommendations of Dr. Jensen, the Guardian ad Litem, 
Dr. Jenkins and the Special Master for future visitation except that Garth Hardinger is to have no 
contact with Baylie except in a supervised clinical setting. 
5. Garth Hardinger is to submit to a psychosexual evaluation prior to the next court 
review. 
6. The parties are to cooperate with and obtain a family evaluation and psychosexual 
investigation by Dr. Jay Jensen. 
7. Each party is to pay one half of Dr. Jensen's fee. Final apportionment is reserved to a 
later date. 
8. The next court review will be December 11. 2000 at 9:00 a.m. 
Dated this Z1^ day of October 2000 
BY THE COURT / ' ^ ' [ " X 
j [g j _ * — JOE 
Judge Jeril B. W^bn ° u U ^ / ^ * ^ 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAKING 
I hereby certify that on this Hfj day of October, 2000,1 mailed a true and correct copy 
of the forgoing Finding of Fact Conclusions of Law and Order to the following: 
Attorney Brook Sessions 
3325 N University Avenue Suite 200 
Jamestown Square, Clocktower Building 
Provo, UT 84604 
Attorney Kelly Frye 
Guardian Ad Litem 
Box at Juvenile Court 
Attorney Dana Burrows 
1149 West Center 




Notice of Appeal (R. 536-538) 
FILED 
NOV 01 2000 
Juvenile Court 
Fourth District 
BROOK J. SESSIONS (6136) 
HARRIS & CARTER 
Attorneys for Parents (Scotts) 
3325 N. Univ. #200 
Provo U T 84604 
Phone: (801) 375-9801 Fax: (801) 377-1149 
IN THE FOURTH DISTRICT JUVENILE COURT 
IN AND FOR UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
In the interest of: 
BLUNDELL, BAYLBE (07/29/96) 
Persons under eighteen (18) years of age. 
NOTICE OF APPEAL 
Case No.: 968282 001 
Judge: JERIL B. WILSON 
TO THE ABOVE COURT, THE HARDINGERS, THE GUARDIAN AD LITEM, 
THE SPECIAL MASTER, AGENTS OF THE ABOVE, AND TO DANA BURROWS: 
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that Ken and Kimberly Scott, by and 
through his counsel, Brook Sessions of Harris & Carter, hereby 
appeal the ruling of the Court on the Motion to Quash and 
Objection to Setting Hearings without re-opening the file. 
This appeal is to The Utah Court of Appeals. This notice is 
filed within 30 days of said judgment and is otherwise timely. 
The Clerk of the above court is requested to transmit to the 
STATE OF UTAH 1
 e e 
COUNTY OF UTAH J S S 
1, the undersigned, Clerk of the Juvenile District Court of 
Utah County, Utah, do hereby certify that the annexed and 
foregomg is a true and full copy of an original document 
on file in my office. 
Witness my hand and seal of said court this 2*^ 
day of ~7l SYzw fa* » £t>tio 
prt Clerk ~ 
appellate court the records and other documents as is required by 
law. 
Brook Sessions PC 
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I hereby certify that on the J day of-August, 2000,1 mailed or delivered a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing to each of the following: 
Dana Burrows 
Attorney at Law 
1149 West Center Street 
Orem, UT 84057 
Ms. Elizabeth Dalton 
Court Appointed Special Master 
11509 N.Granite Circle 
Highland UT 84003 
Office of the Guardian Ad Litem 
Attention: Kelly Frye 
32 W. Center #205 
Provo UT 84601 
Phone: 344-8516 Fax: / O « ^ 
Secretary 
APPENDIX "H" 
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure 3 
MICHIES UTAH RULES ANNOTATED 
Copyright (c) 1953-2002 by the Michie Company 
A Division of Reed Elsevier Inc. 
and Reed Elsevier Properties Inc. 
All Rights Reserved 
* THIS DOCUMENT IS CURRENT THROUGH CHANGES RECEIVED AS OF 
FEBRUARY 20, 2002 * 
STATE RULES 
UTAH RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 
TITLE II. APPEALS FROM JUDGMENTS AND ORDERS OF TRIAL COURTS 
Utah R. App. P. Rule 3 (2002) 
Rule 3. Appeal as of right: how taken. 
(a) Filing appeal from final orders and judgments. 
An appeal may be taken from a district or juvenile court to the appellate court with 
jurisdiction over the appeal from all final orders and judgments, except as otherwise provided 
by law, by filing a notice of appeal with the clerk of the trial court within the time allowed 
by Rule 4. Failure of an appellant to take any step other than the timely filing of a notice of 
appeal does not affect the validity of the appeal but is ground only for such action as the 
appellate court deems appropriate, which may include dismissal of the appeal or other 
sanctions short of dismissal as well as the award of attorney fees. 
(b) Joint or consolidated appeals. 
If two or more parties are entitled to appeal from a judgment or order and their interests 
are such as to make joinder practicable, they may file a joint notice of appeal or may join in 
an appeal of another party after filing separate timely notices of appeal Joint appeals may 
proceed as a single appeal with a single appellant. Individual appeals may be consolidated 
by order of the appellate court upon its own motion or upon motion of a party, or by 
stipulation of the parties to the separate appeals. 
(c) Designation of parties. 
The party taking the appeal shall be known as the appellant and the adverse party as the 
appellee. The title of the action or proceeding shall not be changed in consequence of the 
appeal, except where otherwise directed by the appellate court. In original proceedings in the 
appellate court, the party making the original application shall be known as the petitioner and 
any other party as the respondent. 
(d) Content of notice of appeal. 
The notice of appeal shall specify the party or parties taking the appeal; shall designate 
the judgment or order, or part thereof, appealed from; shall designate the court from which 
the appeal is taken; and shall designate the court to which the appeal is taken. 
(e) Service of notice of appeal. 
The party taking the appeal shall give notice of the filing of a notice of appeal by serving 
personally or mailing a copy thereof to counsel of record of each party to the judgment or 
order; or, if the party is not represented by counsel, then on the party at the party's last 
known address. A certificate evidencing such service shall be filed with the notice of appeal. 
If counsel of record is served, the certificate of service shall designate the name of the party 
represented by that counsel. 
(f) Filing fee in civil appeals. 
At the time of filing any notice of separate, joint, or cross appeal in a civil case, the party 
taking the appeal shall pay to the clerk of the trial court the filing fee established by law. The 
clerk of the trial court shall not accept a notice of appeal unless the filing fee is paid. 
(g) Docketing of appeal. 
Upon the filing of the notice of appeal and payment of the required fee, the clerk of the 
trial court shall immediately transmit a certified copy of the notice of appeal, showing the 
date of its filing, and a copy of the bond required by Rule 6 or a certification by the clerk that 
the bond has been filed, to the clerk of the appellate court. Upon receipt of the copy of the 
notice of appeal the clerk of the appellate court shall enter the appeal upon the docket. An 
appeal shall be docketed under the title given to the action in the trial court, with the 
appellant identified as such, but if the title does not contain the name of the appellant, such 
name shall be added to the title. 
HISTORY: Amended effective October 1, 1992; November 1, 1996; November 1, 1999 
APPENDIX "I" 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-3a-121 (Supp. 2002) 
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 
Copyright (c) 2002 by Matthew Bender & Company, Inc. 
a member of the LexisNexis Group. 
All rights reserved. 
*** STATUTES CURRENT THROUGH THE 2002 5TH SPECIAL SESSION *** 
*** ANNOTATIONS CURRENT THROUGH 2002 UT 35, 2002 UT APP 82 *** 
*** AND MARCH 10, 2002 (FEDERAL CASES) *** 
TITLE 78. JUDICIAL CODE 
PARTI. COURTS 
CHAPTER 3a. JUVENILE COURTS 
PARTI. GENERAL PROVISIONS 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-3a-121 (2002) 
§ 78-3a-121. Continuing jurisdiction of juvenile court — Period of and termination of 
jurisdiction — Notice of discharge from custody of Division of Substance Abuse and Mental 
Health or Utah State Developmental Center — Transfer of continuing jurisdiction to other 
district 
(1) Jurisdiction of a minor obtained by the court through adjudication under Section 78-3a-
118 continues for purposes of this chapter until he becomes 21 years of age, unless 
terminated earlier. However, the court retains jurisdiction beyond the age of 21 of a person 
who has refused or failed to pay any fine or victim restitution ordered by the court, but only 
for the purpose of causing compliance with existing orders. 
(2) (a) The continuing jurisdiction of the court terminates: 
(i) upon order of the court; 
(ii) upon commitment to a secure youth corrections facility; or 
(iii) upon commencement of proceedings in adult cases under Section 78-3a-801. 
(b) The continuing jurisdiction of the court is not terminated by marriage. 
(3) When a minor has been committed by the court to the custody of the Division of 
Substance Abuse and Mental Health, a local mental health authority or its designee, or to the 
Utah State Developmental Center, the director of the Division of Substance Abuse and 
Mental Health, the local mental health authority or its designee, or the superintendent of the 
Utah State Developmental Center shall give the court written notice of its intention to 
discharge, release, or parole the minor not fewer than five days prior to the discharge, 
release, or parole. 
(4) Jurisdiction over a minor on probation or under protective supervision, or of a minor 
who is otherwise under the continuing jurisdiction of the court, may be transferred by the 
court to the court of another district, if the receiving court consents, or upon direction of the 
chair of the Board of Juvenile Court Judges. The receiving court has the same powers with 
respect to the minor that it would have if the proceedings originated in that court. 
HISTORY: C. 1953, 78-3a-520, enacted by L. 1996, ch. 1, § 67; 1996, ch. 234, § 17; 
renumbered by L. 1997, ch. 365, § 35; 2002 (5th S.S.), ch. 8, § 141. 
NOTES: 
AMENDMENT NOTES. -The 1996 amendment, effective April 29, 1996, added "a local 
mental health authority or its designee" twice in Subsection (3). 
The 1997 amendment, effective March 21,1997, renumbered this section, which formerly 
appeared as § 78-3a-520, and updated internal references in Subsection (1). 
The 2002 (5th S.S ) amendment, effective September 8. 2002, added "Substance Abuse 
and" before "Mental Health" twice in Subsection (3). 
EFFECTIVE DATES. -Laws 1996, ch. 1, § 94 makes the act effective on January 31,1996. 
APPENDIX "J" 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-3a-901 (Supp. 2002) 
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 
Copyright (c) 2002 by Matthew Bender & Company, Inc. 
a member of the LexisNexis Group. 
All rights reserved. 
*** STATUTES CURRENT THROUGH THE 2002 5TH SPECIAL SESSION *** 
*** ANNOTATIONS CURRENT THROUGH 2002 UT 35, 2002 UT APP 82 *** 
*** AND MARCH 10, 2002 (FEDERAL CASES) *** 
TITLE 78. JUDICIAL CODE 
PARTI. COURTS 
CHAPTER 3a. JUVENILE COURTS 
PART 9. MISCELLANEOUS PROVISIONS 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-3a-901 (2002) 
§ 78-3a-901. Violation of order of court ~ Contempt — Penalty 
(1) Any person who willfully violates or refuses to obey any order of the court may be 
proceeded against for contempt of court. 
(2) Any person 18 years of age or older found in contempt of court may be punished in 
accordance with Section 78-32-10. 
(3) (a) Any person younger than 18 years of age found in contempt of court may be 
punished by any disposition permitted under Section 78-3a-l 18, except for commitment to 
a secure facility. 
(b) The court may stay or suspend all or part of the punishment upon compliance with 
conditions imposed by the court. 
(4) The court may enforce orders of fines, fees, or restitution through garnishments, wage 
withholdings, supplementary proceedings, or executions. 
HISTORY: C. 1953, 78-3a-901, enacted by L. 1996, ch. 1, § 76; 1997, ch. 358, § 2. 
NOTES: 
AMENDMENT NOTES. -The 1997 amendment, effective May 5, 1997, substituted the 
phrase beginning "in accordance with" in Subsection (2) and "any disposition" in Subsection 
(3) for a list of specific penalties and in Subsection (3)(b) substituted "the punishment" for 
"the fine or the commitment to the Division of Youth Corrections." 
COORDINATION CLAUSE. -Laws 1997, ch. 358, § 4 directs that "Section 78-3a-l 18" 
be substituted for "Section 78-3a-516" in Subsection (3)(a) to conform to renumbering by 
L.1997,ch 365. 
EFFECTIVE DATES. -Laws 1996, ch. 1, § 94 makes the act effective on January 31,1996. 
NOTES APPLICABLE TO ENTIRE CHAPTER 
REVISION OF CHAPTER.Laws 1996, ch. 1 revised this chapter by repealing § § 78-3a-l 
through 78-3a-65, governing procedure in juvenile courts, and enacting new sections 
throughout the chapter, effective January 31, 1996. A table of comparable provisions, 
prepared by the Office of Legislative Research and General Counsel, appears below the 
repeal note under § 78-3a-l. 
COMPILER'S NOTES.Laws 1997, ch. 329, which enacted or amended sections throughout 
this chapter, provides that it "applies to every abuse, neglect, and dependency case in which 
parental rights have not been terminated as of July 1, 1997. All other provisions of Title 78, 
Chapter 3a relating to abuse, neglect, and dependency proceedings, and Title 62A, Chapter 
4a apply to every case in which parental rights have not been terminated as of the effective 
date of the applicable statute." 
